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This paper, a chapter in the forthcoming Oxford University Press Handbook of the Indian Economy,
edited by Chetan Ghate, considers India’s experience with fiscal (responsibility) rules during the past
decade. After reviewing the basic facts concerning public debt and deficits in India, the background
and basic arithmetic of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, 2003 (FRBMA) are
presented and commented upon. With the very small number of data points at our disposal, no formal
statistical estimation and hypothesis testing about the efficacy of the rules can even be attempted. Instead
we critically explore the outcomes of the FRBMA over the 5-year period of its operation, 2004/05-2008/09,
using an eclectic but comprehensive metric comprising quantitative targets, qualitative strictures, transparency,
integrity, and overall financial performance over the business cycle. We also briefly review fiscal responsibility
legislation (and outcomes) at the state level. The evidence suggests that in recent years the fiscal space
“vacated” by the states has been usurped by the central government. Finally, the recommendations
of the 13th Finance Commission regarding a roadmap for fiscal consolidation are examined. We also
outline a basic incentive compatible framework for state and central governments to hold each other
accountable over agreed pre-determined targets.
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A chapter on fiscal rules for this Handbook is apposite on three grounds.  First, 
the terminal date for India’s maiden attempt at legislating fiscal virtue passed relatively 
recently (end-March 2009).
1  Second, the challenge of reining in large fiscal deficits has 
reemerged in India and elsewhere.  At present India’s fiscal position, as measured by 
such common indicators as the general government budget deficit and the general 
government gross debt (as shares of GDP) puts it in the same camp as recognised fiscally 
stretched states like Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and the UK.
2  Third, against the 
background of a worrisome fiscal stance, the 13
th Finance Commission has suggested 
contours of successor fiscal responsibility legislation to the first one, whose targets were 
effective 2004/05-2008/09.
3 
There are four standard reasons and one somewhat unconventional driver for 
unease when a country’s public sector debt and deficit are high and/or rising.  First, there 
is the possibility of sovereign insolvency or bankruptcy of the Exchequer.  Sustainability 
issues can come to the fore during economic downturns if the public debt and the primary 
(non-interest) public sector deficit are not already at prudent levels.   
                                                 
1 The Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, 2003 received the Presidential assent on August 
26, 2003.  It was the first attempt to legislate fiscal responsibility at the Union level.  It included the 
specific requirement that the Central Government revenue (or current) deficit be eliminated by the 31
st 
March, 2008 and that thereafter an adequate revenue surplus be built up.  Neither objective was achieved. 
2 The central government’s deficit in 2008/09, including off-budget issue of bonds (in lieu of cash 
payment), was 7.8 percent of GDP, the highest since 1991.  (The Indian fiscal year runs from April 1 to 
March 31.) 
3 The main (but not only) term of reference of the Finance Commission, which is appointed quinquennially, 
is to determine the distribution (for a 5-year period) between the central government and the state 
governments of taxes collected by the centre.  The 13
th Finance Commission, in addition, was requested by 
the Union government to help with the following: “Having regard to the need to bring the liabilities of the 
central government on account of oil, food and fertiliser bonds into the fiscal accounting, and the impact of 
various other obligations of the central government on the deficit targets, the Commission may review the 
roadmap for fiscal adjustments and suggest a suitably revised roadmap with a view to maintaining the gains 
of fiscal consolidation through 2010 to 2015” (Government of India [2010c]). 3 
 
To achieve debt sustainability, either revenues will have to be raised or public 
spending cut.  Higher revenues often require higher marginal tax rates, which is 
distortionary and curbs potential output.  Public spending cuts often fall on productivity-
raising infrastructure investment or on socially desirable support for the vulnerable and 
weak.  In addition, if consumption behaviour has Keynesian features (a change in current 
disposable household income has an effect on consumption through channels other than 
its contribution to permanent household income) and output is demand-constrained, the 
Keynesian demand multipliers will cause actual output to contract when fiscal policy is 
tightened.  Finally, cross-country studies of the relationship between debt and GDP 
growth indicate public debt and external debt thresholds that induce tipping points for 
growth performance (Reinhart and Rogoff [2010]).
4  The observed negative correlation 
between debt burdens and growth could reflect either the negative impact on growth of 
the fiscal tightening measures implemented to reduce the public and external debt 
burdens or the response of the bond markets to a failure to implement such measures. 
The second reason a rising public debt burden is a concern is financial crowding 
out.  In the absence of debt neutrality or Ricardian equivalence, the substitution of 
government borrowing for current taxes on labour income will tend to raise private 
consumption.
5  For an economy with full utilisation of resources this will lead either to 
displacement of private investment and other interest-sensitive forms of private spending 
or to an increase in the current account deficit of the balance of payments.   
India has restricted international mobility of financial capital.  Public sector debt, 
in particular, is mostly sold and held at home.  In an economy where the overall general 
                                                 
4 Growth is 1.1-1.6 percent lower in emerging market economies when debt is above 90 percent of GDP.  
The simplest relationship between growth and public debt has been put forward in Barro [1979]. 
5 A public-expenditure induced increase in household consumption. 4 
 
government budget deficit is estimated by the International Monetary Fund [2010] to be 
10.9 percent of GDP for 2009/10, of which 10.6 percent of GDP is domestically financed, 
and where household gross financial saving as a share of GDP is 10.4 percent, pressures 
for higher interest rates can only be defied for so long.  If in response to high and rising 
domestic interest rates, India’s private sector were to resort to (less costly) large scale 
borrowing abroad in foreign currency, this can lead to vulnerabilities and problems 
beyond official debt servicing.  Although this is not an issue for India presently, it is 
noteworthy that external borrowing by India’s private sector has increased as a share of 
GDP in recent years, and the share of long-term private non-guaranteed debt plus short-
term external debt (mainly trade credits) in India’s total external debt has increased from 
a fifth to two-thirds between 2002/03 and 2008/09.  Historical experience from 
developing countries and emerging markets and post-August 2007 evidence from the 
advanced industrial countries demonstrates that private debts can become public debts if 
the private entities involved are deemed too systemically significant (too big, too 
complex, too interconnected) or too politically connected to fail.  It is a complex exercise 
in political economy to determine how much private external debt and private foreign-
currency –denominated debt represents contingent public exposure.  
The third reason a rising public debt burden is of concern pertains to the 
contribution of unsustainable fiscal policy to volatility and uncertainty, which in turn may 
have adverse consequences for investment and growth.  Both the standard Keynesian 
approach and tax-smoothing neoclassical models advocate a tax policy that should 
smooth either taxes as a share of GDP (in the Keynesian approach) or the average 
marginal tax rate (in the neoclassical tax-smoothing approach).  A robust tax policy 5 
 
therefore should be neither procyclical nor require sharp anticipated corrections, thus 
stabilizing economic activity (from the Keynesian perspective) or minimizing the excess 
burden of distortionary taxation (in the tax smoothing neoclassical perspective).  Excess 
volatility can encourage private savers and investors to grant excessive weight to short 
run considerations, which may lead to a suboptimal allocation of resources for investment 
(Serven [1998]).   
The fourth reason for disquiet about rising public debt burdens relates to the risk 
of an eventual monetisation of persistent deficits – fiscal dominance over monetary 
policy – and thus to their potential inflationary consequences, a pattern that India is not 
unfamiliar with (Buiter and Patel [1992]).  For a given primary government deficit (as a 
share of GDP), a higher ratio of public debt to GDP will, if the long-run interest rate 
exceeds the long-run growth rate of GDP, increase the amount of real resources that will 
have to be extracted through seigniorage (base money issuance).  This seigniorage or 
anticipated inflation tax may, however, not be as important (or as tempting) to the 
government as the unanticipated inflation tax on domestic-currency-denominated 
interest-bearing debt.  The lure of reducing the real value of current and future debt 
service through an unanticipated burst of inflation will be stronger the longer the average 
maturity of the fixed-rate domestic currency debt.  Almost all India’s public debt is 
rupee-denominated.  The IMF estimates the current stock of general government gross 
debt to be more than 80 percent of annual*'3. About 40 percent of Government of 
India Rupee loans outstanding at March 31 2008 had a maturity of over 10 years (Reserve 
Bank of India [2009b] – also see footnotes).
6 
7     
                                                 
6 On average, for the years 1970/71-2007/08, the share of central government loans with a maturity of over 
10 years has been 55.6 percent.  It is noteworthy that, over this four-decade period, the four years when the 6 
 
Fear that the government may, at some future instance, be tempted to inflate away 
part or all of the burden of the domestic-currency denominated debt, usually manifests 
itself before the event through the rising nominal rates associated with higher expected 
inflation and possibly also with a higher inflation risk premium.  Inflation in March 2010 
was running at an annual rate of close to 10 percent – enough to get the bond markets to 
sit up and take notice.
8 
The fifth (relatively unexplored/under emphasised) cause for apprehension about 
a rising government debt burden is that of exhausting the sovereign’s fiscal elbow room 
from a (macro) risk management perspective; in other words, there is merit in keeping 
some powder dry (as a form of self protection) for instances of stress (transmission of 
external shocks, domestic banking crisis requiring recapitalisation, a natural calamity or 
external conflict).  This can be beneficial as regards maintaining investor confidence and, 
therefore, helps to keep a lid on yields expected and required by debt markets.  A 
perception of loss of fiscal control combined with unfavourable developments in other 
“variables” in the political economy mix like, say, internal/external security threats, can 
put the country over an “inflection point” related to overall (mis)governance in a country-
risk metric; alternatively, high debt levels signal an “impairment of capacity to remain a 
self determining nation” (Shelton [2009]).    
The outline for the rest of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2 we set out the 
basic arithmetic of government debt, deficits and solvency.  In section 3, we briefly 
                                                                                                                                                 
share of long-dated loans was in excess of 80 percent was during the years 1987/88-1990/91 – that is, the 
years leading up to and including the last crisis! 
7 For state governments, 46 percent of the securities outstanding on March 31 2009 were due for repayment 
in 2017/18 and beyond (Reserve Bank of India [2010]).  
8 Headline (wholesale) inflation has accelerated sharply – in part due to food price increases on account of a 
poor monsoon – from a low of minus one percent in June 2009.  7 
 
review some facts concerning public debt and deficits in India.  In section 4 the 
background and basic arithmetic of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management 
Act, 2003 (FRBMA) and the associated rules are presented and commented upon.  With 
the very small number of data points at our disposal, no formal estimation-based 
hypotheses about the efficacy of rules can even be attempted.  Therefore, in section 5, the 
outcomes of the FRBMA over the 5-year period of its operation, 2004/05-2008/09, are 
critically explored along an eclectic but comprehensive metric comprising quantitative 
targets, qualitative strictures, transparency, integrity, and overall financial performance 
over the business cycle.  In section 6, we briefly review fiscal responsibility legislation 
(and outcomes) at the state level.  Taking sections 5 and 6 together it will become clear to 
the reader that in recent years the fiscal space “vacated” by the states has been (more 
than) usurped by the central government.  In section 7, the recommendations of the 13
th 
Finance Commission regarding a roadmap for fiscal consolidation are formally 
examined.  The section also attempts to outline a basic incentive compatible framework 
for state and central governments to hold each other accountable over agreed pre-
determined targets.  Section 8 contains some concluding remarks. 
2. The basic arithmetic of public debt, deficits and solvency 
We define the following notation, which can apply, after suitable consolidations, 
to the debt, deficit, spending and revenue totals of any level of government.  In this 
section “government” is used generically.  It could refer to the central government, to the 
general government (the consolidated central, state and local government plus the 
assorted social funds, including social security retirement, health and disability), to the 
public sector (which consolidates the state enterprise sector with the general government) 8 
 
and the consolidated public sector and central bank;  f  is the government financial deficit 
as a fraction of GDP, i is the average effective nominal interest rate on Rupee-
denominated government non-monetary debt, b is the value of the total government non-
monetary debt (rupee-denominated and foreign currency-denominated) as a share of 
GDP, 
* i  is the average effective nominal interest rate on government debt denominated in 
foreign currency, 
c g  government consumption spending as a share of GDP (excluding 
depreciation of the government capital stock), 
I g  gross government physical capital 
formation as a share of GDP, δ  the proportional depreciation rate of the government 
capital stock, k  the government capital stock as a share of GDP, θ  the gross financial 
rate of return (which can of course be negative) on government capital, α  the share of 
foreign currency debt in total government debt, ε  the proportional rate of nominal 





  is the domestic inflation rate, P the general price level,  
τ  government taxes net of transfers as a share of GDP, η  is non-tax revenue (such as 
royalties on natural resources like offshore oil and natural gas; telecom license fees; and 
proceeds from the auction of the spectrum) as a share of GDP and  priv is privatisation 
receipts as a share of GDP. When the central bank is consolidated with the general 
government or the public sector, non-tax revenues include seigniorage revenues as a 







, where M is the nominal stock of base 
money (coin and currency in circulation plus bank reserves held with the central bank), P 
is the GDP deflator, Y is real GDP and 
M i  is the effective nominal interest rate on base 9 
 
money (zero on coin and currency; whatever the central bank sets or charges on its 




CI f g g ib i i b k priv αθτ η ≡++ + − −− − −  (2.1) 
It follows that over time the government net non-monetary debt to GDP ratio, b  
evolves as follows: 
  () bf bn b εαπ ≡+ −+ &  (2.2) 
or, equivalently, 
 
* () ( )
CI br n b g g k p r i vi i b θ τη ε α ≡− + + − − − − ++ − &  (2.3) 






 is the growth rate of real 
output.   
  The government primary (non-interest) surplus as a share of GDP, s, is defined as: 
 
* () sf i b i i b α ≡− + + −  (2.4) 
It follows that the dynamic equation for the government’s non-monetary debt to GDP 
ratio can also be written as: 
 
* () ( ) bs r n b i i b ε α ≡− + − + + − &  (2.5) 
For expositional simplicity, we ignore in what follows India’s foreign currency-
denominated public debt, which is in any case small.
9  This reduces the two 
representations of the government’s non-monetary debt dynamics to the following form: 
  () bf n b π ≡−+ &  (2.6) 
                                                 
9 Instead of setting  0 α = , we could assume that uncovered interest parity holds, that is, 
* 0. ii ε +− =  10 
 
 () bs r n b ≡− + − &  (2.7) 
  The standard solvency constraint is that the present discounted value of the 
terminal government non-monetary debt be non-positive, that is, 
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≤  (2.8) 
  This no-Ponzi finance or no-pyramid scheme constraint on the government’s 
fiscal-financial plans implies that the growth rate of the public debt cannot forever be 
greater than the effective interest rate on the public debt: at some point a solvent 
government will have to run primary surpluses. More specifically, (2.8) implies, from 
(2.7), that the government’s intertemporal budget constraint takes the following form: 
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  That is, the outstanding value of the government’s non-monetary debt cannot 
exceed the present discounted value of its future primary surpluses.  Let  () st be the 
value at time  t of the government’s permanent primary surplus as a share of GDP, that 
is, that constant value of the primary surplus (as a share of GDP) whose present 
discounted value is the same (if it were to maintained over an infinite horizon) as the 
present discounted value of the primary surplus (as a share of GDP) that is actually 
planned or expected.
10 Loosely, the permanent primary surplus (as a share of GDP) is the 
average expected or planned future primary surplus as a share of GDP.  We can also 
                                                 
10 That is, 
[] []
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define the permanent excess of the interest rate over the growth rate of GDP at time t, 
















⎡ ⎤ ∫ −≡⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦ ∫  (2.10) 
The lowest permanent primary surplus (as a share of GDP) consistent with 
government solvency, 
min() st  is the one that satisfies (2.9) with equality.  It follows that 
the solvency constraint can be written intuitively and simply as follows: 
  ( )
min () () () () () st s t rt nt bt ≥≡ −  (2.11) 
The likelihood of government insolvency is greater the smaller its capacity to 
generate future primary surpluses (by raising taxes and cutting public spending or 
through seigniorage), the larger the outstanding stock of non-monetary government debt, 
the higher the interest rate on the public debt and the lower the growth rate of GDP. 
It may seem that the solvency constraint (2.8) permits the ratio of non-monetary 
government debt to GDP to rise without bound, as long as the growth rate of the debt 
does not exceed the effective interest rate on the debt. This condition would be satisfied 
even if the growth rate of government debt were to exceed the growth rate of GDP 
forever, as long as the effective interest rate on the government’s non-monetary debt is 
lower than the growth rate of the government debt in the long run. 
Although this is technically correct, note from (2.11) that if the government debt 
to GDP ratio were to rise without bound, the minimum required permanent primary 
surplus to maintain solvency, would also rise without bound, as a share of GDP, as long 
as  () () () 0 rt nt −> .  Since government spending cannot be cut below zero, this would 12 
 
imply an unbounded tax to GDP ratio – not an economically interesting prospect with 
distortionary taxes and significant tax administration, collection and compliance costs. 
Some authors indeed have proposed a bounded government non-monetary debt-
to-GDP ratio as a primitive solvency constraint, instead of (2.8).  We prefer to think of it 
instead as a further constraint on feasible government fiscal-financial programmes, 
implied by the absence of non-distortionary (lump-sum) taxation and the costly nature of 
transferring resources from the private to the public sector through taxation. 
Except for the initial government debt to GDP ratio, all the key terms in the 
government’s intertemporal budget constraint (2.9) or (2.11) – the permanent primary 
surplus, the long-run real interest rate and the expected long-run real growth rate are 
unobservable.  This is obviously the case for the permanent primary surplus (as a share of 
GDP) and the permanent growth rate of real GDP.  The permanent real interest rate could 
in principle be observable today, but as India (in common with all other countries), does 
not have a complete set of index-linked government debt instruments with maturities 
ranging from instantaneous to Kingdom Come, the permanent real interest too is 
expectational and unobservable. 
As regards the likely behaviour of the real interest rate and the real growth rate in 
the long run, the experiences of other countries at different stages of economic 
development can provide a guide.  It is clear that even if India were to grow for one or 
two generations at average real GDP growth rates of 8 percent per annum or higher, 
growth at this rate cannot last forever.  The experience of past successful emerging 
markets, from Japan to Korea and Singapore provide evidence of that.  The relevant 
interest rate is partly determined by the equilibration of global and domestic saving-13 
 
investment balances (with capital controls providing a greater role for domestic factors) 
and partly by country-specific drivers of sovereign default risk perceptions.  Reinhart and 
Rogoff [2009] identify three sovereign defaults or debt reschedulings for India on its 
external debt since independence, in 1958, 1969 and 1972, but none on domestically held 
sovereign debt.  The lion’s share of India’s sovereign and sovereign-guaranteed debt 
today is both rupee-denominated and held domestically.   
Even if we knew the entire time structure of sovereign real interest rates and real 
GDP growth rates, the solvency constraint (2.11) only gives us the minimum value of the 
permanent primary surplus, that is, the value that will have to be generated on average in 
the future if the government is to remain solvent.  It does not tell us that future primary 
surplus will have to be a constant share of GDP.  Indeed, the mathematics are consistent 
with high and rising primary deficits for 1000 years followed by an eternity of large 
primary surpluses. 
It is here that government credibility becomes a crucial driver of the market’s 
response to government plans for future fiscal virtue.  If the government has been 
persistently procyclical in the most recent boom period or periods, spending the windfalls 
created by unsustainable growth and other friendly acts of God and of the external 
environment (good harvests, favourable terms of trade shocks) or even cutting tax rates or 
forgiving debts owed by private agents to the sovereign, then its credibility when it 
announces future fiscal tightening measures but without any up-front public spending 
cuts or tax increases, is likely to be minimal.  The markets become doubting Thomases, 
for whom seeing is believing.   14 
 
Once the government has lost its reputation for fiscal probity, it is hard to regain.  
It may even require pro-cyclical actions during the next downturn (raising taxes or 
cutting public spending) to convince the private sector that the government is capable of 
inflicting fiscal pain.  As will become clear from the discussion that follows, we believe 
that most of the state governments have by now gained a reputation for fiscal rectitude.  
The central government, on the other hand, has no reputation for responsible 
countercyclical behaviour during recent booms to fall back on.  It has depleted its 
reputational capital that would have allowed it to engage in countercyclical fiscal policy 
actions during the next cyclical downturn, or indeed to take other temporary adverse 
shock-mitigating measures without spooking the markets and adding a sovereign risk 
premium to the risk-free rate.  
The history of Fiscal Responsibility Laws in India is so short that no formal 
statistical or model-based tests of their influence on the sustainability of the government’s 
fiscal-financial programme is feasible.  The discussion of the evidence that follows is 
therefore inevitably informal. The solvency arithmetic framework spelled out in this 
section does, however, guide, direct and discipline the discussion that follows and is 
therefore indispensible. 
3. Some facts on deficits and debt 
While much of the discussion in the chapter will be on the Union government’s 
fiscal stance and institutional arrangements, we will intersperse our comment and 
analysis on four ‘flow’ measures of fiscal balance and their associated ‘stock’ or public 
debt measures: 15 
 
•  The central government fiscal and revenue deficits, including off-budget 
expenditure/borrowing. 
•  Fiscal and revenue deficits of state governments. 
•  The consolidated general government fiscal deficit covering the central and state 
governments. 
•  The overall public sector fiscal deficit comprising the consolidated fiscal balances 
of the general government and the non-bank public enterprises. 
India exhibits a sustained proclivity for running large fiscal deficits compared to 
not only its peer group of emerging economies, but also globally (Ahya and Gupta 
[2009]).  Over the last three decades, India has found it impossible to sustain, for an 
appreciable time, an overall public sector financial deficit of less than 8 percent of GDP 
(see Figure 1 below);
11 analogously, it has been extremely rare for the general 
government fiscal deficit to be lower than 6 percent of GDP (see Appendix Figure A1). 
                                                 
11 The fiscal gap data used for Figure 1 are from Table 2.2 in the Appendix of the Economic Survey 
(Government of India [2010a] and previous years).  The data from 2007/08 onwards have been revised/re-
estimated as more up-to-date budgetary data are available from other official sources; also note that off-
budget bonds issued to public enterprises are not included in this measure (as it is intra-public sector 
“borrowing”).  The measure in Figure 1 is the closest estimate of the public sector borrowing requirement 
(PSBR).     16 
 
 
Since the crisis of the early 1990’s, which had fiscal origins, fiscal deficits in 
India have approached levels, including in recent years, that may be considered 
imprudent, even alarming, if not corrected.  But India has, thus far, avoided explosive 
debt-GDP ratios of the kind that lead to the 1990/91 crisis.  Between 2002/03 and 
2007/08, debt ratios in India declined substantially – the net public debt level is relatively 
low, and is largely domestically held, primarily in the banking system, much of which is 
state controlled.  Statutorily, 25 percent of bank deposits have to be deployed for holding 
government (and other approved) securities.  Over the last two years this ratio, the 
statutory liquidity ratio, has usually been in the range of 27-28 percent, that is, higher 
than the mandatory floor. 
The current net total debt (NTD)-GDP ratio is estimated at about 56 percent, 
which compares with 74 percent of GDP in 2002/03 (see Figure 2 below and Appendix 17 
 
Table A1);
12 the share of official foreign currency-denominated debt is about a sixth, and 
official foreign exchange reserves at 20 percent of GDP are adequate to cover all foreign 




Foreign debt servicing is not a danger; India’s vulnerability to financial shocks 
has eased to the point that an external financial crisis is not a material risk.  As an aside, 
the debate within the country (between important policy-making nodes) of the utility of 
large official foreign reserves as “self-insurance cover” has been settled conclusively; 
India emerged unscathed from the global financial crisis in no small part due to its large 
holdings of external reserves, which appreciably helped to cushion the backwash from 
illiquid international financial markets. 
                                                 
12 The NTD consolidates central and state governments, as also the central bank and non-bank central 
public enterprises. 
13 The extant gross total public debt to GDP ratio is estimated at about 76 percent of GDP (column for GTD 
in Appendix Table A1). 18 
 
In addition, India continues to maintain selective (discretionary) capital controls, 
particularly those that keep arbitrage-type flows – for instance, external borrowing by 
domestic financial intermediaries, investment by foreign institutional investors in fixed 
income securities (official and corporate), or, cross-border borrowing of a short-term 
nature by practically anyone – in check.  It is therefore fair to say that while India faced a 
combined internal (fiscal) and external transfer problem during the years leading up to 
the crisis of 1991, the weakening of the fiscal position in recent years represents almost 
exclusively an internal resource transfer problem. 
4. Fiscal rules 
a. Background 
The Indian government’s experience of fiscal rules has been brief.  The first one 
wholly related to ending the fiscal abuse of the central bank.  In September 1994 an 
agreement (without legislated sanction) to phase out by 1997/98 the instrument of ad hoc 
Treasury Bills which hitherto facilitated automatic monetisation of the budget deficit – 
the borrowing gap after all other financing instruments have been exhausted – was 
reached between the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the Central Exchequer.  This, in 
itself, did not preclude the RBI from participating in primary issues of central 
government securities or operating in the secondary markets for central government debt, 
but it left these decisions to the RBI’s discretion. 
After moderate improvement during the five years immediately following the 
balance of payments crisis, 1992/93-1996/97, fiscal fundamentals in India had 
deteriorated again, as exemplified by rising ratios of public sector debt and public sector 
financial deficit to GDP.  The public sector financial deficit as a share of GDP was 19 
 
around the same level in 1998/99 as in the crisis year of 1990/91.  The deficit persisted at 
about 10 percent of GDP until 2003/04, after which a modest consolidation took place for 
a brief period; ‘normal service’ has been resumed since then.
14  The 5-year period of 
correction and subsequent slippage broadly overlaps with the Fiscal Responsibility and 
Budget Management Act, FRBMA (which ran its course up to March 31 2009). 
The fiscal rule in the FRBMA was narrow in the sense that it kept outside its 
ambit public sector enterprises (PSEs) and state governments (and their enterprises).  The 
latter was a (legitimate) recognition of the federal nature of the country, provided that, de 
jure and de facto, the central government is not in the final analysis responsible for the 
debts of the state and other lower-tier governments.  It is a practice found is some other 
federal states, but not all).  The former is difficult to rationalise, unless there truly is an 
arm’s length relationship between the government and the corporations that it has 
sponsored and/or owns, that is, if there is no explicit or implicit guarantee of PSE debt by 
the sovereign.  Regardless, it extends the scope for shifting fiscal policy implementation 
“off budget” and “off balance sheet”. 
b. Brief description 
The Indian Parliament, in August 2003
15, voted for the FRBMA.  The Act was 
amended in July 2004, with the terminal date for achieving the numerical targets 
pertaining to fiscal indicators extended by one year to 2008/09 (a case of moving the goal 
posts with the game having barely started!); the annual targets for fiscal correction were 
                                                 
14 The general government fiscal deficit declined from 8.5 percent of GDP in 2003/04 to 6.8 percent of 
GDP in 2005/06. 
15 The bill was first introduced in Parliament in December 2000. 20 
 
specified by Rules framed under the Act (Government of India (GoI) [2005a]).  There 
were also clauses with regard to guarantees and debt.
16   
The FRBMA, prima facie, broadly satisfies three unexceptionable attributes of a 
numerical fiscal rule.  Specifically, it is well defined in terms of explicating time-bound 
targets for relevant indicators, it is simple and transparent in terms of the targeted 
outcomes, which is helpful for effective communication of government policy (or, for 
opposition parties to take the government of the day to task), and it is monitorable.
17 
The government’s desire to rein in its finances seemed sincere enough.  For 
scripting an operational strategy towards the fiscal goals embedded in the legislation, the 
then Finance Minister, in February 2004, constituted a Task Force.  In July, under a new 
political dispensation, the Ministry of Finance published the comprehensive analysis and 
recommendations of the Task Force in the form of a report (GoI [2004]).  The critical 
recommendations were on the revenue side of the deficit equation, specifically measures 
to enhance direct taxes by 2 percentage points of GDP and to shift the revenue base of 
indirect taxes to include a greater share of services.  After all this, in his presentation of 
the 2005/06 Union budget in February 2005, the Finance Minister remarked that he was 
“left with no option but to press the `pause’ button vis-à-vis the FRBM Act” (GoI 
[2005b]).  
c. Basic arithmetic of the “hard law” component of the FRBMA 
There were two key “hard” features of the FRBMA.  First, the restriction that by 2008/09 
the overall central government financial deficit be not more than three percent of GDP: 
                                                 
16 The increase was restricted to 0.5 percent of GDP per annum for guarantees and for debt additional 
liabilities were capped at 9 percent of GDP for 2004/05, for subsequent years there was an annual reduction 
in the limit of one percentage point of GDP. 
17 This metric of attributes is from Corbacho and Schwartz [2007]. 21 
 
  0.03 d ≤  (4.1) 
To help satisfy (4.1), the FRBMA Rules specified an operational trajectory on d of an 
annual reduction of at least 0.3 percentage point of GDP
18; therefore, a minimum 1.5 
percentage point of GDP cumulative reduction in the centre’s financial deficit.  Second, 
the ‘golden rule’ restraint that the revenue or current budget should be in balance or 
surplus by 2008/09.  It was unclear whether this meant that central government 
borrowing should not exceed gross central government investment (including 
depreciation) or net central government investment (net of depreciation).  In the first case 
the (gross) golden rule can be written as: 
 
I dg ≤  (4.2) 
In the second case, the (net) golden rule can be written as: 
 
I dg k δ ≤− (4.3) 
The Rules stipulated a ½ percentage point of GDP (or more) annual reduction for the 
revenue deficit.  A rigorous enforcement of (4.1) would ensure that the central 
government’s long term debt-GDP ratio will not be explosive even with modest growth 
prospects. 
d. “Soft” aspects of the law 
The FRBMA introduced initiatives for the first time that pertained to fiscal 
planning.  The Act obligated the government to, inter alia, prepare a medium term fiscal 
policy statement (encompassing three-year rolling targets) that lays out the time path for 
attaining the (quantitative) fiscal goals.  Although the government was obliged to take 
steps to enhance revenues and/or reduce expenditure (“appropriate measures”), leeway 
                                                 
18 The terminal target for the fiscal deficit was stipulated in the rules (framed in July 2004) to the 2003 Act.  
The target of balance on the revenue account was enshrined in the Act itself.   22 
 
was allowed for targets going awry on “exceptional grounds” such as natural calamities 
and/or national security. 
The statute also required that the RBI will not subscribe to government paper after 
March 31 2006.  Nevertheless, borrowing from the RBI on account of “temporary excess 
of cash disbursement over cash receipts during any financial year”, essentially “ways and 
means advances” was permitted.
19  Finally, as a nod towards greater integrity of the 
budgetary process, the Rules “mandate the government to disclose changes in accounting 
standards, policies and practices that have a bearing on the fiscal indicators” (GoI 
[2005a]). 
On the composition of outstanding liabilities of the central government in official 
documents setting out the targets, several observations are warranted.  First, the variable 
is a measure of gross debt; official foreign exchange holdings and securities held by the 
central bank are ignored, which means that these two items would have to be netted out if 
the central bank and the government are consolidated. 
Second, “reserve funds and deposits” are added to the stock of outstanding debt; 
these liabilities are on account of borrowing from statutory funds within the government 
and therefore are not strictly in the nature of IOUs to entities external to the government. 
The  market value of (listed) Indian government-sponsored enterprises, GSEs, 
including banks is estimated at US$ 300 billion, a liquid asset, same as official foreign 
                                                 
19 Since April 2004, the Government of India in consultation with the RBI has launched the Market 
Stabilisation Scheme (MSS).  The scheme envisages issue of treasury bills and/or dated securities to 
(solely) absorb excess liquidity, arising largely from significant foreign exchange inflows. During 2009/10, 
as per the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the central government and the RBI, the 
ceiling of outstanding liabilities (face value of dated securities plus discounted value of treasury bills) at 
any given time has been kept at Rs. 500 billion. The estimated outstanding liabilities under MSS in respect 
of market loans and 91/182/364 day Treasury Bills are separately reflected in the government’s Statement 
of Liabilities.  In our computation of consolidated net debt ratios for Figure 2 (and Appendix Table A1), we 
have netted out both MSS-related liabilities and (conventional) net RBI credit outstanding to government. 23 
 
currency reserves.  The value of the government’s financial interest in these GSEs (equity 
plus any other net financial claims on these GSEs such as made to these GSEs or GSE 
bonds owned by the state) should be added as part of the government’s net financial 
assets (or offset against its debt) if these assets can realistically be sold or disposed of at 
the these valuations.  
Assume for simplicity that equity is the only claim of the government on the 
GSEs.  Even if they cannot realise (sell) the equity, it will have a ‘continuation value’ in 
public ownership: the present discounted value (PDV) of future dividend payments by the 
GSEs to the government.  Any non-tax revenues would be included in equation (2.1) in 
term  () k ) ( δ θ −   or in η .  If there are taxes paid on the profits of the GSEs, the value to 
the government would be the sum of the PDV of the after-tax profits.  The PDV of the 
profit taxes would be included separately in the government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint.  The correct value of the GSEs on the public sector balance sheet is the PDV 
of future dividends paid to the government until they sell the equity, plus the PDV of the 
future privatisation of the GSE (the sale of the equity).  That flow of dividend income is 
therefore in the government’s budget balance – even in the primary balance as profit 
income if ‘primary’ is net of interest income only.   
The solvency constraint (intertemporal budget constraint) that the existing net 
debt not exceed the PDV of future primary surpluses can either be written with net debt 
defined inclusively to included (with a –ve sign) the value of the government’s financial 
assets, in which case the stream of future primary surpluses will be smaller, because 
future dividends are no longer part of the primary surplus, or it can be defined narrowly 
to include only the value of the government’s financial liabilities, with the primary 24 
 
surplus now including all the earnings streams associated with the government’s 
ownership of financial assets.  
Provided all net cash flows accruing to the state from the GSEs are either 
capitalised as financial assets or included in the stream of future primary surpluses, it 
does not matter where you put them.  One could even kick all the government’s debt out 
of the intertemporal budget constraint and reduce the PDV of future primary surpluses by 
the same amount, because the market value of the debt is the PDV of future interest 
payments and repayment of principal.  The only slightly tricky issue is when the 
continuation value of the government’s equity in the GSEs (their value should they 
continue to be owned by the government) is different from their value under private 
ownership.  We would then face the tricky task of valuing the equity as the sum of the 
PDV of the dividends it would pay in the public sector for as long as it remains publicly 
owned, plus the PDV of the privatisation receipts, whenever privatisation is assumed to 
take place.  A conservative approach would value the assets as the smaller of their 
permanent continuation value in the public sector and their immediate privatisation value. 
5. Outcomes 
The impact of fiscal rules in India inevitably relates to how they are expected to 
change over time and to what degree they are likely to be enforced.  Since these rules 
have  no constitutional standing, they can be can be modified easily over time (and even 
ignored as we’ll see below).  Furthermore, a Westminster-style parliamentary system 
means there is virtually no scope for “independent” checks and balances at the political 
level, viz., an executive “veto point” over expenditure. 25 
 
In this section we attempt to (heuristically) determine whether the FRBMA rules 
have affected conduct of fiscal policies of the Indian government with regard to stated 
goals of fiscal correction, or done anything more than clarify the government’s intentions.  
In a previous paper, the first draft of which was written in July 2005, our comment on the 
expected outcome under the FRBMA was: “The requirement that the revenue budget be 
in balance or surplus is very likely to be the binding constraint on the central government, 
with the 3 percent ceiling on its overall financial deficit a non-binding constraint” (Buiter 
and Patel [2006]). 
The central government’s fiscal deficit for the terminal year, 2008/09, was 6 
percent of GDP, excluding estimated off budget expenditure (settled by IOUs or simply 
ignored) of about 2 percent of GDP.  Indeed, as shown in Table 1 below, the central 
government has missed both the fiscal and revenue deficit targets by some margin. 
Obviously, the FRBMA has failed to bind the government to either of the main legislated 
targets.   26 
 
Table 1: Central government fiscal indicators (as % of GDP) 
  2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10
a 
(a)  Fiscal  deficit  (FD).  5.9 4.5 3.9 4.0 3.3 2.6 6.0 6.7 
(a)´ FD with off- budget 
bonds issued in that year. 
NA NA NA 4.3 4.8 3.0 7.8 6.9 
(a)´´ Off-budget bonds o/s 










(b)  Revenue  deficit  (RD). 4.4 3.6 2.4 2.5 1.9 1.1 4.5 5.3 
(b)´ RD with off-budget 
bonds issued in that year. 
NA NA NA 2.8 3.4 1.5 6.3 5.5 
(c) Primary balance with off 
-budget borrowing in last 5 
years (+ indicates surplus). 
-1.1 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -1.3  +0.5  -4.4 -3.4 
(d) Off-budget expenditure.  NA NA NA 0.4 1.8 1.9 2.3 0.6 
(e)  Net  tax-GDP  ratio.  6.5 6.8 6.9 7.3 8.2 8.9 8.0 7.5 
(f) Outstanding Liabilities.
b  63.1 67.3 68.8 65.7 64.4 63.8 59.6 58.9 
(g) Guarantees.  3.7 3.2 3.4 3.1 2.7 2.2 NA NA 
(h) Real GDP growth (%). 
t
3.8 8.5 7.5 9.5 9.7 9.0 6.7  ≈7.2
c 
(i) Nominal growth (%).  7.0  12.0 17.6 14.4 15.6 15.5 12.7 ≈11
c 
(j) GDP deflator (change in 
%). 
3.8 3.6 5.6 4.7 5.6 5.3 7.2 3.6
c 
(k) Weighted avg. interest 
on outstanding internal 
liabilities (%). 
9.5 8.8 8.5 8.1 8.4 8.5 8.4 8.7 
(l) Weighted avg. interest 
rate on govt. dated securities 
(%). 
7.34 5.71 6.11 7.34 7.89 8.12 NA  NA 
 
Notes: NA: Not applicable/available; a: all fiscal numbers for 2009/10 are revised estimates; b: Definition 
of FRBMA used, which excludes off-budget bonds outstanding, and foreign liabilities only includes 
sovereign debt.  In February 2010 the government changed the definition of outstanding liabilities  – for the 
better – by excluding the share of states’ in small savings collected by the centre; for 2009/10, the number 
under the new definition is disclosed at 51.5 percent of GDP but still excluding off-budget bonds (Medium 
Term Fiscal Policy Statement in GoI [2010b]); c: projection.  
 
Sources: (a), (a)´, (b), (b)´, (c): Budget at a glance (various years), Budget speech for 2010/11, and 
Economic Survey 2009/10 and previous years (GoI [2010a, 2010b]); (a)´´: For the 2009/10 figure, Report 
of 13
th Finance Commission (GoI [2010c]), and for previous years interpolated by authors based on budget 
documents (GoI [2009b, 2010b]; (d): Analyst estimates; (e): Indian Public Finance Statistics 2008/09 (GoI 
[2009c]), Economic Survey 2009/10 (GoI [2010a]), Budget at a glance 2010 (GoI [2010b]) (figures are for 
centre’s share in taxes that it collects); (f): Medium Term Fiscal Policy Statement as part of budget 
documents, Ministry of Finance, GoI (various years); (g) Annual Report, RBI [2009a]; (h), (i), (j), (k): 
Economic Survey 2008/09 and 2009/10 (GoI [2009a, 2010a]); and (l): Handbook of Statistics on the Indian 
Economy, RBI [2009b]. 
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It should be apparent that after 2004/05, not only has there been no fiscal 
correction once off-budget items are included, but indicators have mostly deteriorated.   
From the above outturn table, taking into account off-budget expenditure, it is amply 
clear that the FRBMA “transition” annual targets towards a 3 percent of GDP fiscal 
deficit and balance on the revenue account by 2008/09 were exceeded before the onset of 
the global recession towards the end of 2008 (also see Patel [2008a]).  The adverse 
evolution in fiscal balances was not on account of the operation of automatic stabilisers 
during a cyclical slowdown; on the contrary, the Indian government’s revenues have been 
buoyant –  the gross tax-GDP ratio increased from 9.7 percent in 2004/05 to 12.6 percent 
in 2007/08 – on the back of an almost 9 percent average annual real growth rate.
20   
The recent profligacy of the central government has its primary driver in populist 
spending policies by the ruling coalition leading up to national elections in May 2009; 
three stimulus packages (including a reduction in indirect taxes) starting in late 2008 to 
counter the global recessionary headwinds only helped matters along in the same 
direction.  Much of the slippage on the expenditure side can be attributed to large and 
increasing energy, food & fertiliser subsidies, funding loss-making public sector units, 
expansion of a rural income support scheme (started in 2005), increase in salaries and 
pensions of civil servants (implemented in 2008), and a huge agricultural) loan waiver 
scheme (announced in early 2008, but not budgeted for!). 
The FRBMA’s provisos for the central government’s (gross) outstanding 
liabilities and guarantees have been comfortably met (Table 1 above and also see the 
second column in Table A1 in the Appendix).  Liabilities have declined even with an 
                                                 
20 The tax-GDP ratio slipped in 2008/09 due to, in part, steep cuts in indirect taxes introduced in September 
2008. 28 
 
annual average central government fiscal deficit over the five years at 4.8 percent of GDP 
(including off budget bonds); the driver for this happy state of affairs is India’s 
unprecedented growth performance in recent years – annual average nominal GDP 
growth of 15 percent during the 5 years of the FRBMA’s operation – in comparison to 
the government’s cost of borrowing. 
It is possible to simulate the central government’s long-run debt-GDP ratios if, 
say, the present (average) fiscal deficit continues forever into the future: 
  0.048 d ≤  (5.1) 
Ignoring foreign currency-denominated debt for simplicity, the consistent application of 
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 (5.3) 
Were India to maintain a long-term nominal GDP growth rate,  , n π +  of, say, 0.0625 the 
central government’s long-run debt to annual GDP ratio would be 76.8 percent – hardly a 
comfortable level.
23  Of course, the debt ratio becomes even more worrisome when the 
                                                 
21 Notation and definitions are identical to those used in previous sections. 
22 This is the familiar “no Ponzi finance” terminal boundary condition constraining the growth of the public 
debt in the long run. 
23 India will not have a 7 percent real (or 11.5 percent nominal) GDP growth rate forever.  By the time 
population stops growing and India’s GDP per capita is at the West-European level, real growth will 29 
 
deficits of other levels of government are also included and appropriately consolidated, as 
should be the case.  For instance, a public sector financial deficit of 10 percent of GDP 
“caps” the (broad) public long-run debt to annual GDP ratio at about 160 percent of GDP 
– undoubtedly a fiscal high-wire act. 
Time consistency and enforcement 
Any limit on the magnitude of the permissible deficit, regardless of whether it 
applies to the overall deficit or just to the revenue (current) deficit, restricts the 
government’s ability to engage in countercyclical deficit financing during economic 
downturns,  unless during normal and prosperous times the government generates 
sufficiently large surpluses to avoid hitting the deficit ceiling during bad times.  It may be 
possible (at least conceptually) to have arrangements, institutions, laws, rules, regulations 
or conventions that can induce the sovereign to impose discipline during good times on 
itself.  Was there any feature of the FRBMA that encouraged the government not to 
follow a procyclical policy during periods of exceptionally strong growth performance 
(as during 2003/04-2007/08), or exceptionally low interest rates (as during 2002/03-
2007/08).
24  The FRBMA had no inbuilt carrots (to run smaller deficits) or sticks (for 
missed targets); it suffered from the same drawbacks as some other high profile examples 
of fiscal responsibility legislation (FRL).  Non-compliance by the central government has 
not been politically costly; there has been limited attention from the electorate, the media, 
or even opposition parties to the subject matter!  In essence reliance on reputation costs 
has been ineffective.  Indeed, it is widely felt that supplementary bills that boost 
                                                                                                                                                 
probably be more like 2 percent per annum and inflation tolerance will likely also be at the current 
advanced industrial country 2 percent level.  Post-catch up, a nominal GDP growth rate of 5 percent is 
probably as reasonable an assumption as any.  The assumption of long-run nominal growth of 0.0625 for 
the simulation would be broadly consistent with this.   
24 Source: Table 121 in RBI [2009b] for interest rates on central and state government dated securities. 30 
 
expenditure from budgeted levels are not only unlikely to be rejected in the Indian 
parliament, they are welcomed with bipartisan fervour; to the best of our knowledge, no 
mid-year spending bill has been rejected. 
The EU’s Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) failed, in both its original and its 
revised 2005 incarnations,  precisely because of the absence of incentives to run larger 
surpluses (or smaller deficits) during upswings and the failure to enforce the penalties 
(including fines) that were, in principle, part of the collective arsenal of SGP 
enforcement.  The failure to exercise fiscal restraint during the upswing by France, 
Germany and Italy was not penalised by the EU’s Council of Ministers in 2004, because 
the political cost-benefit analysis of naming, shaming and fining a leading member of the 
European Union Club militated against collective enforcement of these penalties.
25  The 
latest evidence of the SGP’s failure is the situation of Greece, which “managed” to 
persistently run high and increasing fiscal deficits (some of it hidden), culminating in a 
gap of 12.7 percent of GDP in 2010. But for a last-minute (and clumsily put-together) 
financial backstop provided by the other Euro Area members and the IMF, Greece would 
undoubtedly have been frozen out of the domestic and international financial markets 
during the first quarter of 2010 and forced into default.  Most other Euro Area members, 
and EU members not part of the Euro Area, like the UK, also engaged in reckless pro-
cyclical behaviour during the boom that preceded the financial crisis that erupted in 
August 2007.  It is clear well beyond a reasonable doubt that the Stability and Growth 
Pact was a paper tiger. 
                                                 
25 In the case of the UK, Chancellor Gordon Brown mangled the classification of government borrowing to 
such an extent that its fiscal rule stands broadly discredited. 31 
 
In 1985, the US Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) bill, 
which specified a series of annual deficits leading to a balanced budget in 1991.  If the 
budget was projected to miss the deficit target, then an automatic “sequestration” process 
would take effect in order to ensure the deficit target was met.  Subsequent to the 
modification in the sequestration procedures in 1987 (because the 1985 version was 
found to be unconstitutional), the zero deficit target date was pushed back to 1993 
(Auerbach [2008]).  
To avoid a pro-cyclical fiscal stance against the backdrop of the 1990 recession, 
the GRH was scrapped and replaced with the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA).  The BEA 
did away with the annual overall deficit targets, instead instituting budget rules (spending 
caps) for discretionary spending (as distinct from entitlements), and a rule for legislated 
changes in policy related to taxes and entitlement spending, specifically, that legislated 
changes in these two categories should not increase the deficit (so called “pay-as-you-go” 
(PAYGO) restrictions).   
The BEA’s death was a bipartisan effort.  It started to erode in 1999 under a 
Democratic administration by using the subterfuge of designating enhanced spending as 
“emergency” discretionary spending, which was not subject to caps.  Budget rules were 
changed by Congress to adjust the caps to be consistent with actual spending, and the 
PAYGO rules were set aside before they expired.  This helped to usher in the large 
Republican administration-sponsored tax cuts in 2001 without offsetting revenue 
increases or expenditure restrictions, which the undiluted BEA would have required. Any 
prospect created by the BEA, that public debate in the US might be focused on fiscal 
sustainability and intergenerational (in)equity vanished without trace.   32 
 
Accountability and transparency 
In his budget speech (for fiscal 2008/09) delivered in February 2008, India’s 
Union Finance Minister stated: “It is widely acknowledged that the fiscal position of the 
country has improved tremendously. I am happy to report that the revenue deficit for the 
current year [2007/08] will be 1.4 per cent [of GDP] (against a budget estimate (BE) of 
1.5 per cent) and the fiscal deficit will be 3.1 per cent (against a BE of 3.3 per cent).”  In 
tables related to expenditure, an amount of Rs. 188 billion (0.4 percent of GDP) in the 
form of “Securities issued in the first and second Supplementary Demands for grants 
2007/08 in lieu of subsidies” to oil marketing and fertiliser companies was recognised as 
a below-the-line note (and, thus, off-budget).  The FRBMA’s clauses were obviously 
insufficient to prevent the Finance Minister from excluding (unpaid) dues on account of 
subsidies in calculating the fiscal and revenue deficits.  Moreover, provision for off-
budget bonds was inadequate to cover the expenditure overrun (or, deliberately shown to 
be low); estimates by market analysts suggest that excess expenditure was about 1.9 
percent of GDP in 2007/08.   Not surprisingly, influential commentators have described 
budget numbers in recent years as “fictional”. 
Arrears on account of food, fertiliser and petroleum subsidies have persisted since 
2005/06, with the oil sector as the largest component followed by fertiliser.  The 
petroleum subsidy burden outside the budget reportedly gets split between refining 
(marketing) companies, upstream (production) companies and bonds (IOUs).  About 60-
65 percent of the arrears to companies in this sector have been “settled” through the issue 
of bonds aggregating 3.3 percent of GDP (see row (a)´´ in Table 1).  From an accounting 
perspective, only the bonds component constitutes a government liability, but they are not 33 
 
part of the central government’s liability statement as they are off budget (there is a 
consistency in treatment of both flows and stocks regarding this liability – they are 
ignored!).  The balance is borne by the companies, actually their shareholders, of which 
the government is the largest, but these companies do have other shareholders and are 
publicly listed.
26 As a result of persistent non-payment/arrears by the government for 
goods and services provided by the public sector units (PSUs) borrowing by them is 
likely to increase.  PSUs may even use bonds issued by the central government as 
collateral.
27  Official budget documents, including the medium term fiscal policy 
statement, have, since 2005/06, been silent on deployment of these window dressing 
“strategies” for imparting a respectable sheen to the “headline” fiscal picture. 
6. State-level fiscal responsibility legislation 
Both the central and state governments in India have exhibited a bias for fiscal 
profligacy.  The overall fiscal deterioration during the late 1990s and early years of the 
millennium – due to the impact of an industrial slowdown, Fifth Pay Commission salary 
hikes for government servants, the parlous financial state of government-owned 
electricity utilities, and lower than expected revenue buoyancy – could be blamed on both 
                                                 
26 Profit margins of the three government-owned oil marketing/refining companies have declined by 
between one-half and three-quarters since the mid-nineties.  One of the oil marketing company’s revenue 
has increased eleven-fold since 1992/93, but the equity price has appreciated by less than 5 percent 
(Financial Express [2010]).   
27 Even the central bank has been caught in the vortex of the oil subsidy.  The RBI, between June 5 and 
August 8 2008 in effect provided US$ 4.4 billion to government-owned oil companies in exchange for oil 
bonds (outright purchase or collateralised repo).  These so-called Special Market Operations (SMO) from 
the perspective of the RBI were effectively a swap on the assets side of its balance sheet, specifically, 
Rupee-denominated oil bonds for foreign currency reserves.  Since the liabilities side of the RBI’s balance 
sheet is unchanged, the SMO was monetary neutral.  However, from a fiscal dimension, whether this 
operation was neutral depends on the value imputed to these bonds in exchange for foreign exchange.  It 
was understood at the time that the RBI had to intermediate in this manner to keep oil imports flowing into 
the country because banks were reluctant to accept more of this (largely illiquid) paper issued by the 
government to the oil companies (Patel [2008b]). 34 
 
the Union and state governments and was the primary driver for establishing fiscal rules 
(when the memory of 1991 was still relatively fresh).
28 
State-level FRLs – enacted by individual state governments between 2002 and 
2007 – were an attempt to introduce a framework for rule-bound fiscal consolidation and 
to usher in a regime of transparent and prudent fiscal management.
29  The process was 
encouraged by the recommendations of the 12
th Finance Commission made in 2004, 
which incentivised fiscal correction paths for state governments through the Debt 
Consolidation and Relief Facility (DCRF) in the form of conditional debt restructuring 
and interest rate relief (GoI [2005a]).
 30   
•  Central government loans to states aggregating Rs. 1288 billion (4 percent of 
GDP) could be consolidated and rescheduled for a fresh term of 20 years, at an 
interest rate of 7.5 percent.  The facility was available to only those state 
governments that enacted an FRL. 
•  A debt write-off scheme linked to a reduction of revenue deficits of states.  Under 
this scheme, repayments due from 2005/06 to 2009/10 on central government 
loans contracted up to March 31, 2004 would be eligible for write-off. 
It is pertinent to point out that there are two macro institutional limits on a state’s 
borrowing.  Firstly, a state cannot borrow in the markets without the central 
government’s permission as long as it is in debt to the central government (which is 
always the case).
31  Secondly, there is no scope for the automatic monetisation by 
                                                 
28 The financial deterioration of state-government owned electricity utilities was a major contributor to the 
states’ fiscal malaise during this time (Bhattacharya and Patel [2008]). 
29 Twenty states enacted FRLs in 2005 and 2006. 
30 See Rajaraman and Majumdar [2005] for implications for states of FRLs in the context of 
recommendations of the 12
th Finance Commission. 
31 This means that each state’s annual market borrowing programme, with the RBI as the effective 
merchant banker, has to be approved in Delhi. 35 
 
borrowing from the central bank, although a limited “ways and means advances” facility 
is available to the states.    
While all states except Sikkim and West Bengal have enacted FRLs, we will 
briefly review the FRLs of the first seven states – Kerala, Maharashtra, Karnataka (the 
forerunner), Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab – that legislated them.
32 
33  
The state FRLs impose quantitative and time-bound (4-6 year) targets on revenue and 
fiscal deficits, viz., elimination of the former and reduction of the latter to 3 percentage 
points of gross state domestic product (GSDP).  However, there is one notable exception 
in this regard; Kerala has a ceiling of 2 percent of GSDP for the fiscal deficit (see Table 2 
below for state-wise summary of the seven FRLs and the associated outcomes).  In 
addition, a couple of states have deployed atypical measures.  The Maharashtra 
legislation, enacted in April 2005, stipulates that “The State Government shall by rules 
specify the targets for reduction of fiscal deficit”, with the (operational) target 
“interpreted” in a somewhat novel manner as a “ratio of expenditure on interest to 
revenue receipts”, which actually does not help to limit the fiscal deficit.  To appreciate 
this, let D be the fiscal deficit, G total spending, 
R T  revenue receipts, 
NR T  non-revenue 
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32 The share of these seven states in national output is about one-half.  Notably, three states passed FRLs 
between September 2002 and August 2003 (the central government passed its FRBMA on August 26 
2003). 
33 Analogous to the centre’s FRBMA, there are notable qualitative initiatives pertaining to fiscal planning 
and transparency that are embedded in the state legislations (see Government of Gujarat [2009], for 
example).  The state FRLs require a medium term fiscal policy statement (encompassing multi-year rolling 
targets) that, inter alia, lays out the time path for attaining the fiscal goals, and they also call for those 
changes in accounting standards, government policies and practices that are likely to affect the calculation 
of the fiscal indicators to be disclosed in the respective state assembly. 36 
 
Table 2: State-wise fiscal responsibility legislation targets and performance 
State  Karnataka  Kerala  Tamil Nadu  Punjab  Gujarat  Uttar Pradesh  Maharashtra 
Effective from:  2002/03  2003/04  2002/03 2003/04  2005/06  2004/05  2005/06 
Fiscal Deficit 




Not more than 3% 
by end-March 2006 
2% by end-March 
2007. 
Not more than 3% 
by end-March 2008. 
 
Contain rate of 
growth of FD to 2% 
per annum in 
nominal terms, until 
brought down to 3% 
of GSDP. 
Not more than 3% 
by 2008/09. 
Not more than 3% 
by end-March 
2009. 
Rules to be 
specified for 
reduction of fiscal 
deficit, with the 
target “interpreted 
in the form of a 
ratio of 
expenditure on 
interest to revenue 
receipts.”  
Revenue 
Deficit (RD) as 
% of GSDP  
Nil by end-March 
2006. 
Nil by end-March 
2007. 
Ratio of RD to 
revenue receipts 
(RR) not to exceed 
5% by end-March 
2008. 
Reduce RD as per 
cent of RR by at 
least 5 percentage 
points each year 
until revenue 
balance is achieved. 




onwards.   
Debt as % of 
GSDP   
Total liabilities not 
to exceed 25% of 
GSDP by end-
March 2015. In 
2008/09: 25.5%  
-  Limit on total 
outstanding 
guarantees at 100% 
of revenue receipts: 
Not binding. 
Not to exceed 40% 
by end-March 2007; 
outcome: 42.1%. In 
2008/09: 40% 
30% by 2007/08; 
outcome: 32.7%. 
In 2008/09: 30% 
Not to exceed 25% 
by end-March 
2018.  In 2008/09: 
50.8%. 
- 
as  % of GSDP  FD  RD  FD  RD  FD   RD  FD  RD  FD  RD  FD  RD  FD  RD 
2004/05 2.3  -1.0  4.0  3.3  2.8  0.3  4.2 3.5 4.6  2.1 5.2  2.8  4.8  2.6 
2005/06 2.0  -1.3  3.4  2.5  1.0  -0.8  2.4 1.1 2.8  0.2 3.6  0.5  4.0  0.9 
2006/07  2.3 -2.0 2.7  1.9  1.4  -1.0 3.6  1.4  2.2 -0.7  3.1 -1.6  2.3 -0.2 
2007/08  2.2 -1.6 3.8  2.3  1.2  -1.5 3.3  2.8  1.6 -0.7  4.0 -1.0  -0.5 -2.5 
2008/09  3.5 -0.3 3.5  2.0  2.7  0.0 4.5  2.5  2.9 -0.1  5.3 -1.1  2.3 -0.6 
Note: - indicates surplus.  Sources for data: State Finances – A Study of Budgets [2006/07; 2008/09; 2009/10], Reserve Bank of India; Planning Commission 
website for GSDP numbers.   37
Setting a target (or even a ceiling) for  R
I
T
 does not constrain D in any way!  At any rate, 
Maharashtra did halve the fiscal deficit between 2004/05 and 2008/09. 
Regarding its revenue deficit, Tamil Nadu enjoins the government to reduce the 
ratio of revenue deficit to revenue receipts every year by 3-5 percent (“depending on the 
economic situation in that year”) to a level below 5 percent by end-March 2008.  Four of 
the states in this sample have legislated ceilings for official debt.  Karnataka, Gujarat, 
Uttar Pradesh and Punjab, respectively, have capped their outstanding total liabilities at 
25 percent, 30 percent, 25 percent and 40 percent of their respective GSDP.  On the other 
hand, the Tamil Nadu Act has placed a limit on total outstanding guarantees of one 
hundred percent of total revenue receipts in the preceding year or at 10 percent of GSDP, 
whichever is lower.  Except for Kerala all states have made noteworthy progress on fiscal 
and debt indicators (some earlier than envisaged under the respective FRL) and four of 
the states are running a surplus on the revenue account. 
Fiscal consolidation by states at the aggregate level in recent years has been 
commendable.  Between 2003/04 and 2007/08, the fiscal deficit declined markedly from  
4.4 percent to 1.5 percent of GDP.  The main explanation being that enhanced budget 
revenues were not offset by discretionary action on the expenditure side.  During 
2008/09, the fiscal performance deteriorated somewhat (with the deficit at 2.6 percent of 
GDP, but still below the mandated 3 percent ceiling), due to the slowdown and the 
accompanying moderation in the pace of revenue growth; however, the revenue deficit in 
most states was within the target of zero balance in 2008/09 (RBI [2010]).  States’ 
management of fiscal affairs over both a period of high growth and the subsequent 
slowdown exhibits successful conduct of ‘discretionary countercyclical’ policy within the   38
rules.
34  Therefore, the recent deterioration in the national fiscal situation cannot be 
blamed on Indian state governments, contrary to opinions proffered elsewhere that states 
stand in the way of achieving sustained overall consolidation (Hausmann and Purfield 
[2004]).  Nevertheless, there are three factors that could cast a shadow over the future: 
First, the beneficial impact to states of the debt restructuring will become less important 
over time
35; second, the steady-state effects of Pay Commission awards on government 
salaries and pensions usually take a couple of years to permeate through in full in the 
government accounts after the increase is announced
36; and third, if states don’t adjust 
(average) electricity tariffs regularly to match (average) cost of generation and supply, 
the adverse impact on state government fiscal health will turn out to be large in due 
course, much like in the early 2000s (Patel and Bhattacharya [2010]). 
7. What next? 
  It is not surprising that, given the existing fiscal situation, there has been a flurry 
of activity.  Both the Report of the 13
th Finance Commission and the central 
government’s 2010/11 budget have laid out a road map to cut the fiscal deficit and public 
debt over the next five years.  It is not yet clear that a new fiscal responsibility law will be 
drawn up.  Although the “golden rule” (a balanced revenue budget) has been maintained 
as an objective in the latest proposals, the important change in emphasis is the 
dominance, over the next five years, of three gross public debt-GDP ceilings (in contrast 
to the fixed (linear) annual reduction in the revenue and fiscal deficits embedded in the 
FRBMA): 
                                                 
34 The Government of India permitted states to borrow one-half percent of GSDP more in 2008/09 and a 
further one-half percent of GSDP in 2009/10 as countercyclical measures for reviving growth.   
35 Debt relief has been provided to states several times over the last four decades. 
36 States bear a larger burden compared to the central government with regard to pay revisions because they 
have more staff on their rolls, in part because they are responsible for delivery of social services (like 
schools, health etc.), and law and order (police), which are intrinsically labour intensive.   39
 ( ) 0.448
c bT≤  (7.1) 
 ( ) 0.243
s bT≤  (7.2) 
 ( ) 0.678
cs bT
∪ ≤  (7.3) 
Where ( )
c bT is the central government’s terminal date,T , gross debt-GDP ratio,  ( )
s bT 
is the state governments’ gross debt ratio, and  ( )
cs bT
∪  is the consolidated general 
government gross debt ratio at the same date.
37  The estimated starting ratios are 
0 ( ) 0.548
c bt = ,  0 ( ) 0.271




39  The principal public debt 
challenge in India, as things stand, is for the central government to reduce its debt-GDP 
ratio by ten percentage points over five years for meeting (7.1) (and concomitantly (7.3)).  
The government has sought to activate the debt goal for 2014/15, by disclosing rolling 
targets for the revenue and fiscal deficits, which, almost by definition, would continue to 
remain the levers for achieving (7.1), but may cease to be legally-binding intermediate 
“sign posts” in future legislation. 
The 2014/15 target for the central government’s fiscal deficit is 3 percent of GDP 
– identical to that required by the erstwhile FRBMA –, and the general government target 
is 5.4 percent of GDP (GoI [2010c]).  It is sobering that in the last three decades, the 
general government deficit has been less than 6 percent of GDP in only two years.  The 
                                                 
37 Since the Finance Minister’s most recent budget speech mentions a status paper within six months, which 
would include a road map for curtailing public debt, it is not clear whether the central government has 
already formally accepted (7.1) proposed in GoI [2010c].  Nevertheless, the budget documents strongly 
endorse a debt-GDP ceiling (GoI [2010b]). 
38  0 t is April 1 2010.  The central government’s ratio of 0.548 includes outstanding off-budget bonds 
equivalent to 3.3 percent of GDP.  As observed earlier, the central government’s medium term fiscal policy 
statements have consistently failed to recognise off-budget bonds, but they are acknowledged to be a 
liability of the central government by the 13
th Finance Commission (see Tables 9.2 and 9.7 in GoI [2010c]). 
39 These 2009/10 debt ratios also differ from those presented in Appendix Table A1 on two grounds, viz., 
the set of reasons cited in section 4, and our motivation is to obtain, as far as possible, a consolidated and 
conceptually consistent measure of net total public (domestic and foreign) debt comprising central & state 
governments, non-bank public enterprises, and the central bank.    40
basic arithmetic of the latest medium term fiscal strategy can hardly be much different 
from that of the FRBMA since the challenges, goals and instruments are virtually 
identical. If  0.054
cs d
∪ ≤  (general government deficit of 5.4 percent) is consistently 
adhered to, using the same set of assumptions for the long term that were deployed in 
section 5, viz.,  0.0625 n π += , the general government’s long-run debt to annual GDP 
ratio would be capped at 86.4 percent. 
The 13
th Finance Commission’s Report, drawing lessons from the central 
government’s conduct in recent years has, to its credit, made thoughtful and constructive 
suggestions for changes in the areas of transparency, (limited) in-built flexibility, and 
enhancing integrity of fiscal policy in the design of future legally-binding rules.   
Specifically, transparency is sought to be imparted by asking the government to make 
explicit assumptions underlying expenditure and revenue projections “and the band 
within which these parameters can vary while remaining consistent with [legislated] 
targets”; the argument is that this will compel the government to make an evidence-based 
case for relaxation of targets. 
Furthermore, future legislation will have to spell out “the nature of shocks that 
would require a relaxation of targets”.
40  Unfortunately, the Report (implicitly) seems to 
endorse (temporary) relaxation of targets for sharp increases in oil prices, although this 
would only make sense if the commodity price increases were temporary.  The 
suggestion presumes that it is ex ante possible for the Indian government to discern 
whether a shock is temporary or permanent.  As it is, the government is still paying 
subsidies for price changes that took place several quarters ago.  Budget goals should not 
                                                 
40 The (laundry) list of shocks that the Commission has specified includes: “agro-climatic events of a 
national dimension”, global recessions and shocks caused by domestic or external events like asset price 
bubbles or systemic crises in important sectors like the financial markets.   41
be at the mercy of changes in the international price of imported petroleum.  After all, oil 
is not the only systemically important commodity whose price is volatile. 
There are two further observations.  More detailed conceptual motivation for the 
2014/15 deficit targets and debt ceilings would have been enlightening; for instance, it is 
not clear why the resting point/steady state for the aggregate fiscal deficit of states should 
be 2.4 percent of GDP when 3 percent of GDP was the erstwhile norm (GoI [2005a]).  
Formal entrenchment of discretionary flexibility in a fiscal rule for responding to 
exogenous shocks is hardly a “core objective” of public finance as the Commission 
makes it out to be – governments everywhere find a way of spending money beyond 
budgeted targets quite easily.  Instead, the Commission spurned the opportunity to 
demonstrate innovation regarding the urgent and difficult task of designing and 
implementing a time consistent fiscal rule for the sovereign (in a democracy which shows 
a sustained proclivity for running high fiscal deficits without public opprobrium).   
The main difficulty thrown up by our analysis of outcomes under the FRBMA 
and other FRLs remains the design of a fiscal rule to incentivise the government not to 
give in to a procyclical bias, which, behaviourally and in practice, is especially pertinent 
for policy during upswings. 
It takes a thief to catch a thief?
41 
The most important reason why legislated fiscal rules have met a sorry end is “the 
failure to discover a way of tying a nation’s fiscal Ulysses to the mast, with the result that 
the siren song of fiscal retrenchment tomorrow but fiscal expansion today will continue 
to lead policy makers astray” (Buiter and Patel [2006]). Is there a countervailing actor to 
effectively police the sovereign’s fiscal behaviour?  In a federal country like India, the 
                                                 
41 Or alternatively, it takes a policeman to catch a policeman?   42
answer could be, well, another level of government, specifically the states.  It may then 
be possible to “punish” one level of government for transgressing its commitment 
towards the general deficit target consistent with (7.3) above.  For example, the margin 
by which a deficit target is exceeded by, say, the centre in a particular year would not 
only have to made up next year (as the debt-GDP ratio has to be met), but it would also 
have to cut the deficit by a further pre-specified amount (“punishment”) to allow the 
states to run a higher deficit of the same quantum.
42  Since states are politically powerful, 
it would be more difficult for the central government to brush them aside than to ignore 
fiscal legislation signed by the President of India (as all Union legislation in India has to 
be).
43 
44  In the taxonomy of outcomes, the central government’s failure to honour its 





Where Y and N denote, respectively, success (honouring one’s fiscal commitment) and 
failure (not honouring it).  The Centre chooses the Y or N heading the columns, the States 
the rows.  The numerical pairs of payoffs in the shaded 2x2 submatrix represent the 
benefit derived by the States (first element) and the Centre (second element) from a 
particular pairing of choices.  The example represents the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma 
configuration where defecting (N) is a dominant strategy for both players, even though 
                                                 
42 The tables, of course, would be reversed if states under achieve and the central government meets its 
commitment.   
43 States in India are not averse to using courts to protect their rights and sphere of influence granted under 
the constitution. 
44 Major implicit assumptions are that states will have annual deficits that are not too dissimilar, and that 









 Y  N 
Y  10,10  5,12 
N  12,5  7,7   43
the resulting outcome, (N, N), is Pareto-dominated by honouring one’s commitment (Y), 
which leads to the outcome (Y,Y). 
Governments with recourse to the law to enforce a compact governing state-
centre fiscal relations might carry the requisite heft; there is therefore a distinct 
possibility that such a compact would be enforced by the judiciary. Thus, by adding 
another player to the game (the judiciary), it may be possible to arrive at the (Y,Y) 
outcome.   
Rather than modelling this 3-player, multi-stage game, we can capture its essence 




When one player honours his debt commitment but the other does not, the party 
not honouring his commitment gets punished by being forced to transfer, in the next 
fiscal year,  part of his debt allowance to the party that did honour his commitment. Even 
though the defector may still be better off, on balance, than the player that stuck to his 
commitment (9 is better than 8), the reduction in the reward to the defector (from 12 to 9) 
and the increase in the reward for the player who honours his commitment (from 5 to 8), 
mean that (Y,Y) now is the dominant strategy.  One would, of course, have to explain 
why a transgressor would not or could not simply refuse to accept the fiscal punishment 
in the next fiscal year.  The strength and independence of the judiciary provide, we hope, 









 Y  N 
Y  10,10  8,9 
N  9,8  7,7   44
A conceptual scaffolding of the type sketched here may help to underpin 
behaviour by both levels of government towards (nationally beneficial) fiscal rectitude 
embedded in debt limits and targets.      
8. Conclusions 
It is often said that the main reason for India’s historic price stability relative to its 
peer group of developing countries has been the polity’s intolerance of high inflation 
(hence, a conservative monetary stance for the most part).  With regard to fiscal policy, it 
would seem that the preference is for high expenditure and low taxation.  Political 
opportunism (rational at the individual, partisan level) in India as elsewhere calls for the 
postponement of (any) expenditure cuts or tax increases and the prompt spending of 
revenue windfalls – there is always the chance that the political cost of painful fiscal 
retrenchment will be borne by the opposition, when its turn in office comes around.  In 
addition to the reasons outlined in the introduction to this chapter to be concerned about 
high public indebtedness, cynics may argue that the Indian government may want to 
undertake fiscal retrenchment in the near term to re-engineer the next “political business 
cycle”, in time for the next national elections that are due in 2014. 
Unless India reverses the recent trend in its fiscal balances, its net public debt-
GDP ratio will cross thresholds that could undermine its growth performance.  The Union 
government’s primary balance has deteriorated from close to balance a few years back to 
substantial deficits (after proper accounting for off-budget borrowing).  The challenge 
lies at the central government level and pertains to controlling expenditure items that 
have evolved, politically speaking, into entitlements.  The primary deficit therefore has 
the characteristics of being “structural”.  With smaller current fiscal deficits and higher 
saving and investment, the government could make a contribution to faster growth; the   45
period of high growth was not unrelated to the transformation of public sector dissaving 
in 2002/03 to a positive savings ratio of five percent of GDP in 2007/08.
45   
But it is another matter whether India needs a new set of legislative rules of the 
FRBMA type to bind the government to its medium-term fiscal plan, while at the same 
time providing enough discretion for the government to act quickly in times of trouble.  
Another FRL which is not incentive compatible for a myopic and opportunistic 
government, i.e., without mechanisms for implementation and enforcement is as likely to 
be ignored as the FRBMA was.  Given the sorry fate of FRLs in most other parts of the 
world, it is hardly prejudicial to conclude that fiscal virtue cannot be legislated without 
thoughtful mechanism design that renders its practice incentive-compatible.  On the other 
hand, since a general government debt–GDP perspective may be incorporated in India’s 
prospective macroeconomic management approach, it may be possible to have an 
incentive compatible framework with an inbuilt carrot-and-stick strategy that brings in 
the judiciary and thus integrates the central and state governments in a manner that holds 
them credibly accountable and, more importantly, rewards and punishes (enforces) each 
other’s fiscal performance. 
                                                 
45 India’s gross domestic saving ratio is estimated to have declined to 32.5 percent of GDP in 2008/09 from 
36.4 percent of GDP in 2007/08.  The deterioration is almost entirely on account of the sharp drop in public 
sector gross saving from 5 percent of GDP in 2007/08 to 1.4 percent in 2008/09 (see Appendix Figure A2 
and GoI [2010a]).   46
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Indian public debt as percent of GDP 
  CDD  SDD PEDD NTDD  TFD  GTD  R  NTFD  NTD 
1970/71  17.2 4.2  0.3  21.7  13.5 35.2  1.6 11.9  33.6 
1971/72  16.8 4.3  0.3  21.4  13.6 34.9  1.8 11.8  33.2 
1972/73  17.2 4.1  0.3  21.7  13.9 35.6  1.7 12.2  33.9 
1973/74  14.5 3.8  0.2  18.5  12.8 31.3  1.6 11.2  29.7 
1974/75  13.8 3.6  0.5  17.0  12.3 30.2  1.4 11.0  28.8 
1975/76  16.2 4.0  0.7  20.9  14.5 35.3  2.3 12.2  33.0 
1976/77  16.6 4.1  1.0  21.7  13.9 35.5  3.6 10.2  31.9 
1977/78  20.7 4.0  0.9  25.6  12.5 38.1  4.8 7.7  33.3 
1978/79  19.3 4.4  1.2  24.9  12.0 36.9  5.3 6.6  31.6 
1979/80  20.5 4.2  1.5  26.3  12.1 38.5  4.9 7.2  33.5 
1980/81  20.3 4.0  1.5  25.8  11.7 37.5  3.8 7.8  33.6 
1981/82  19.8 4.2  1.5  25.5  12.2 37.6  2.4 9.8  35.2 
1982/83  23.5 4.4  1.9  29.8  13.9 43.7  2.6 11.4  41.1 
1983/84  21.7 4.5  2.0  28.3  14.7 43.0  2.7 12.0  40.2 
1984/85  24.8 4.5  2.2  29.3  16.2 45.5  3.0 13.2  42.6 
1985/86  27.3 5.0  2.3  32.2  17.0 49.2  2.9 14.2  46.4 
1986/87  27.7 5.0  2.6  35.0  18.6 53.6  2.7 15.9  50.9 
1987/88  28.4 5.4  3.1  36.9  19.8 56.7  2.3 17.5  54.4 
1988/89  29.4 5.5  3.9  38.8  22.1 60.9  1.8 20.4  59.1 
1989/90  30.4 5.8  4.4  40.7  26.4 67.0  1.4 25.0  65.6 
1990/91  30.6 6.0  6.4  43.0  29.0 71.9  2.0 27.0  69.9 
1991/92  30.9 6.3  6.1  43.2  40.6 83.8  4.4 36.2  79.4 
1992/93  31.8 6.4  7.0  45.2  36.7 81.9  4.1 32.6  77.8 
1993/94  35.7 6.5  7.1  49.3  33.0 82.3  7.0 26.1  75.4 
1994/95  35.4 6.5  6.1  48.1  28.8 76.9  7.8 21.0  69.1 
1995/96  33.8 6.7  5.7  46.2  25.4 71.6  6.3 19.2  65.3 
1996/97  33.6 7.1  6.6  46.9  22.7 69.5  6.9 15.8  62.6 
1997/98  35.8 7.6  6.2  49.1  22.0 71.1  7.6 14.4  63.5 
1998/99  37.0 7.5  8.2  52.8  21.8 74.6  7.9 13.9  66.7 
1999/00  38.4 10.1 8.0  56.5  20.3 76.8  8.5 11.8  68.3 
2000/01  40.0 12.6 7.2  59.9  18.7 78.5  9.4 9.3  69.1 
2001/02  43.4 14.8 8.0  66.3  17.4 83.6  11.6  5.8  72.1 
2002/03  47.6 17.6 7.4  72.5  16.5 89.0  14.7  1.8  74.3 
2003/04  49.5 20.4 6.8  76.7  10.6 87.3  17.8  -7.2  69.5 
2004/05 48.8  21.3 6.5  76.7  9.3  85.9  19.1 -9.8  68.8 
2005/06 45.5  21.8 6.9  74.1  7.1  81.2  18.2 -11.1  62.9 
2006/07 43.8  20.7 6.9  71.4  6.6  78.0  20.3 -13.7  57.7 
2007/08 46.1  19.4 6.7  72.3  6.9  79.2  25.0 -18.1  54.2 
2008/09 40.5  19.5 5.9  65.9  9.0  74.9  23.0 -14.1  51.9 
2009/10
*  41.8 20.2 NA  NA  NA  ≈76.0
** 20.3 NA  ≈56.0
** 
Definitions  
NTDD  =  CDD + SDD + PEDD (including Rupee-denominated short term debt, for which 
data is unavailable prior to 1990/91.) 
GTD  =  NTDD + TFD 
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Table A1 cont’d… 
 
NTFD  =  TFD – R 
NTD =  NTDD  +  NTFD 
NTDD:    Net total domestic debt. 
TFD:    Foreign currency public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt plus use of IMF 
credit plus imputed short-term public debt. 
GTD:    Gross total debt. 
NTFD:    Net  total  foreign  debt.       
CDD:    Internal (domestic) debt of the central government less net credit outstanding from 
the Reserve Bank of India; plus share of liabilities on account of small savings 
fund; plus other accounts, including provident funds; but excluding bonds issued to 
public enterprises in lieu of cash. 
SDD:    Rupee denominated market and other loans of (and advances to) state governments 
less net credit outstanding from the Reserve Bank of India, and excluding power 
bonds (which is a liability to central government-sponsored enterprises that are 
vendors to the state government-owned power utilities); plus share of liabilities on 
account of small savings (since 1999/00); plus provident funds etc. 
PEDD:     Rupee denominated short- and long-term debt of public enterprises not held by 
government.  
R:    Official foreign exchange reserves including gold and SDRs. 
-:    Indicates net assets.  
*:     Revised estimates from official documents, where available, or, budget estimates 
from official documents. 
**:   Authors’  estimate. 
NA:   Not  available 
 
Sources:  Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy (2009), Reserve Bank of India; 
Report on Currency and Finance, Volume II (various years), Reserve Bank of India; Budget 
Documents, Statement of Liabilities of the Central Government, Receipts Budget  (2010 and 
previous years), Government of India; State Finances – A Study of Budgets of 2009/10, 
Reserve Bank of India; Public Enterprises Survey (volumes for 1970/71-2008/09), Bureau of 
Public Enterprises, Government of India; Weekly Statistical Bulletins of the Reserve Bank of 
India; Global Development Finance Report (various years from website), The World Bank. 






Note: The deficit includes off-budget bonds issued by the central government.  The general government 
measure, therefore, treats these bonds differently from the overall (public sector) fiscal gap displayed in 
Figure 1 of section 2.  
Source: RBI [2009b]; data from 2007/08 onwards has been revised using RBI [2010] and GoI [2009b, 
2010b].   
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